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II.

A transition is starting throughout the nation as renewable
energy resources are developed and older fossil-fuel facilities
retire.1 The communities that bear the brunt of fossil-fuel
pollution will also likely bear this transition’s economic
impacts. Yet, there is no guarantee that these communities will
share in the transition’s economic benefits—in particular, the
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1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS
2–22 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr_spm.pdf (“This . . . [r]eport is based on the assessment carried out by
the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC).”).
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building, operation, and ownership of new renewable energy
resources. Renewable energy laws generally do not consider
these types of impacts when determining where to site new
resources.2
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in a
case involving Native Americans in Arizona affected by the
operations and closure of a recently retired coal-fired power
plant, developed a novel plan to generate a revenue stream
from a closed power plant to assist an impacted community
with a transition to renewable energy.3 The CPUC’s decision
provides an important roadmap for other states to consider
communities impacted by the operation and closure of fossilfuel facilities as the energy grid transitions into green
resources.
I.

CONCEPT OF JUST TRANSITION TO A
GREEN ECONOMY

Scientists have found that significant greenhouse gas
reductions would be necessary to avoid the likely devastating
impacts of climate change.4 Reputable scientists have also
found that the Earth is nearing a tipping point where climate
change will be irreversible.5 These impacts are already
occurring.6 Recent years were among the warmest on record,
and studies continue to link climate change to extreme weather
events.7

2. See id. at 14–18.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 1, at 7–8, 18–20.
5. Id. at 13–14; see James Hansen et al., Target CO2: Where Should
Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 225–26 (2008); see also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON
MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTION: FACT SHEET (2011), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/srex/SREX_fact_sheet.pdf
(discussing the likely changes in extreme events).
6. See NOAA Says 2010 Among Warmest on Record; Pew Links Climate,
Harsh Weather Frequency, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at A-14 (June 29,
2011).
7. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he existence of the link between climate change and
extreme weather is not so much theoretical anymore as it is observational.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. BULLETIN OF THE AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2010, SPECIAL
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To mitigate future impacts, federal, state, and local
governments are evaluating options to reduce greenhouse
gases.8 Many efforts focus on the electrical generation industry
since generating electricity from fossil fuels creates
approximately forty percent of the United States’ carbon
dioxide emissions.9 To reduce electricity’s greenhouse gas
levels, reduction plans require increased electricity generation
through renewable, less-polluting resources, or resource
conservation.10 Increased development of renewable energy and
energy efficiency measures can mitigate climate change
impacts and help communities transition away from fossil fuel
dependence.11
A significant barrier to transitioning to clean energy
sources is the local economic dependency fostered by a fossil
fuel economy.12 Many communities remain financially

SUPPLEMENT TO THE BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY,
VOL. 92, NO. 6, JUNE 2011, at S16, S39–40 (J. Blunden et al. eds., 2011).
8. See PEW CTR. OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101:
STATE ACTION 1 (2011), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
climate101-state.pdf (“A wide range of policies have been adopted at the state
and regional levels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, [and] develop clean
energy resources . . . .”).
9. See Electricity Explained: Electricity and the Environment—Basics,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=electricity_environment (last updated Mar. 25, 2013) (“Power
plants that burn fossil fuels and materials made from fossil fuels . . . are the
sources of about 40% of the total U.S. carbon dioxide . . . emissions.”); see also
World Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuel Combustion Reach Record High,
IEA Says, Daily Envt’l Rep. (BNA) No. 101, at A-2 (May 25, 2012) (discussing
the increase of already high levels of “fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide
emissions, mostly from power plants”).
10. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1,
at 14–22.
11. See id.
12. See Christa Marshall, ‘Coal Country’ Poses the Biggest Obstacle in
Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2009/11/02/02climatewire-coal-country-poses-the-biggest-obstacle-in-s79147.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how the majority of states are
economically dependent on coal); see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE
ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION IN THE POWER SECTOR 5, 6 (2010), available at
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/economics_of_
transition.pdf (discussing the general economics of transitioning away from
fossil fuel generation); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels:
Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688–90 (2012)
(outlining transitional considerations of a renewable energy transition).
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dependent upon fossil fuels for their economic development.13
These communities are often low-income communities of color
that disproportionately bear the adverse environmental and
health impacts from fossil fuel exploration, extraction,
production, consumption, and disposal.14 Climate change
resulting from fossil fuel burning will only increase cumulative
environmental and health disparities.15 Communities that bear
a disproportionate impact of environmental pollution also
generally have a higher energy burden,16 which makes them
more vulnerable to fluctuating energy prices17 and the expected
increased energy needs due to climate change.18
A transition to renewable energy could help revitalize
these fossil-fuel dependent communities. Renewable energy
and energy efficiency resources reduce the bills of the
residences where they are installed, and green development

13. See U.N. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE TRANSITION TO A GREEN
ECONOMY: BENEFITS, CHALLENGES AND RISKS FROM A SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVE
9–15
(2012),
available
at
http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Green%20Economy_full%20repo
rt%20final%20for%20posting%20clean.pdf
(describing
the
risks
of
transitioning to a green economy).
14. See MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP: WHAT’S AT
STAKE IF CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE LAW ISN’T DONE RIGHT AND RIGHT AWAY
8–12
(2010),
available
at
http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/
mindingthegap.pdf; Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Evidence of Environmental
Injustice, 12 ENVTL. L. NEWS 1, 3–5 (2003) (“To environmental justice
proponents disproportionate burdens of environmental risk appeared to be
borne by communities populated by people of color or of concentrated
poverty.”); see also Air Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last
updated Sept. 25, 2013) (“Fossil fuel-fired power plants are responsible for 67
percent of the nation’s sulfur dioxide emissions, 23 percent of nitrogen oxide
emissions, and 40 percent of man-made carbon dioxide emissions.”).
15. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 14, at 15–17; Seth B. Shonkoff et al.,
Minding the Climate Gap: Environmental Health and Equity Implications of
Climate Change Mitigation Policies in California, 2 ENVTL. JUST. 173, 173–75
(2009).
16. Energy burden is defined as “the expenditures of the household for
home energy divided by the income of the household.” 42 U.S.C. § 8622(2)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011).
17. The energy burden continues to grow as energy prices for heating oil,
natural gas, electricity, and propane are rising. See CAMPAIGN FOR HOME
ENERGY ASSISTANCE, THE LIHEAP INVESTMENT 1 (2010), available at
http://liheap.org/assets/investment/LIHEAP_investment_june2010.pdf
(discussing a program to provide assistance to low-income households to pay
for heating and cooling their home).
18. See id. at 2 (showing the energy price increases).
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could also create jobs in the community.19 Investment in green
resources has been shown to create more jobs than investment
in the fossil fuel resources.20 Development of renewable energy
resources can also provide a revenue stream and income to
communities.21
II. A CASE STUDY: THE MOHAVE GENERATING
STATION AND ITS IMPACT ON NAVAJO
AND HOPI COMMUNITIES
The case involving the Mohave Generating Station
provides an example of how a transition from fossil fuel to
renewables can be supported. The case demonstrates that
finding a solution requires understanding each community’s
history and opportunities.
The Mohave Generating Station (Mohave) began
operations in 1971.22 It was located in Laughlin, Nevada, along
the Arizona border, and “approximately 75 miles southwest of
the Grand Canyon.”23 The two-unit, 1580 megawatt (MW) coalfired power plant emitted up to 40,000 tons of sulfur dioxide
(SO2) per year and was at one point the largest source of SO2
emissions in the West.24
Mohave was operated by Southern California Edison
(SCE), which was its 56% majority owner.25 Its coal came by
19. See, e.g., L.A. BUS. COUNCIL, MAKING A MARKET: MULTIFAMILY
ROOFTOP SOLAR AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN LOS ANGELES 4, 5, 7 (2011), available
at
http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/LABC-Exec-SummaryBrochure.pdf (estimating that 4500 job years could be created with a 300 MW
multi-family solar program).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEANENERGY POLICIES CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 2, 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/green_economics/green_prosperity/Gree
n_Prosperity.pdf.
21. See L.A. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 6–7, 14–15.
22. Investigation on the Comm’n’s Own Motion of the Maint. & Operating
Practices, Safety Standards & the Reasonableness of Costs Incurred from the
Mohave Coal Plant Accident, Decision No. 94-03-048, 53 CPUC2d 452, 456,
1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 216, at *2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 9, 1994)
[hereinafter Mohave Coal Plant Accident].
23. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/mohave/mofact.html (last visited Oct.
8, 2013).
24. Id.
25. In re S. Cal. Edison Co. Regarding the Distribution of SO2 Allowance
Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave Generating
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way of an usual 275-mile slurry line from the Black Mesa Coal
Mine on the Hopi and Navajo Reservations in Arizona,
operated by Peabody Western Coal Company and jointly owned
by the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe.26 Groundwater from an
aquifer under the Hopi and Navajo reservations, called the Naquifer, provided the water for the slurry line.27
For decades, the Navajo and Hopi had little control over
their coal and water resources.28 “Until 1938, the Department
of the Interior had exclusive authority to lease to private
companies the right to develop natural resources on Indian
land, even over Tribes’ objections.”29 One commentator labeled
these times “the nadir of Native existence on the continent” due
to their loss of land, inactive Tribal governments, and inability
to protect against further encroachments from the outside.30
In 1938, under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA), the
Tribes obtained the right to negotiate their mineral rights
subject to the Secretary of Interior’s oversight.31 “Nevertheless,
the IMLA did little to prevent private companies from
exploiting Tribes’ weak bargaining position, which resulted
from their dire economic circumstances and their lack of
adequate representation, among other factors.”32
With this backdrop, a long history of the Hopi and Navajo
struggle to gain control over and the full value of their
Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Decision Determining Treatment of Sale
Proceeds of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station,
Decision No. 13-02-004, 2013 Cal. PUC LEXIS 69, at *13 (Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Mohave Sulfur Allowances]. It was also
owned by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (10% share),
Nevada Power Company (14% share), and the Salt River Project (20% share).
Id. at *13 n.11.
26. Id.; Opinion Authorizing S. Cal. Edison Co. to Make Necessary &
Appropriate Expenditures on Critical Path Investments at Mohave While
Continuing to Seek Resolution of the Water & Coal Issues & to Establish a
MERMA Account, Decision No. 04-12-016, at 4 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec.
2, 2004) [hereinafter SCE Expenditures].
27. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 5.
28. See Kimberly C. Perdue, Comment, The Changing Scope of the United
States’ Trust Duties to American Indian Tribes: Navajo Nation v. United
States, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 488 (2009).
29. Id.
30. Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal:
Conquest and Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 BYU L. REV. 449,
457 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 28, at 488.
32. Id.
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resources began.33 For the Hopi, it included a history of
attempts at centralized government, overcoming the resistance
to centralized government, and ultimately their reluctance to
separate minerals from their ancestral land of 12,000 years or
more.34 Ultimately, the Hopi’s general counsel in 1962 resolved
territorial disputes with the Navajo and the mineral rights for
Black Mesa, with a fifty-fifty split of coal proceeds.35
This same general counsel then sought to negotiate deals
with Peabody Coal that would ultimately allow coal mining and
using water to slurry coal for the new Mohave facility.36 What
the Hopi did not know was that their attorney was apparently
working concurrently for Peabody Coal.37
The royalty agreements, not surprisingly, were soon
viewed as greatly undervalued. The Hopi received “an
extremely low royalty rate”38 amounting to 3.335% of gross
sales for the coal at the time, as did the Navajo, which the
Interior Department in a later audit concluded was “little more
than half of what the government [was then] receiving.”39 The
lease for water was similarly underpriced.40
While the lease agreement for coal had no reopener clause
that the parties could invoke themselves,41 Article VI of the
lease allowed the U.S. Interior Secretary “to adjust the royalty
rate to a ‘reasonable’ level on the twentieth anniversary of the
lease.”42 As that date approached, the lease now provided
Navajo only 2% of the gross proceeds of coal sales.43 As early as
the 1970s, Navajo began to negotiate with Peabody for a
revision, insisting that the royalty rate be at least 12.5%, the

33. See Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 450–51.
34. See id. at 456–58.
35. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D. Ariz. 1962) (“[S]uch
area is a reservation for the joint use of the Hopi and Navajo Indian Tribes.”),
aff’d, 373 U.S. 758 (1963); Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 463–64.
36. See Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 461–67.
37. Id. at 469–71.
38. Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 221 (2000), rev’d, 263
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
39. Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 470, 471 (alteration in original) (quoting
Jim Richardson & John A. Farrell, Divided Opposition, in The New Indian
Wars, DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 1983, at 19) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See id. at 472.
41. See Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 220.
42. Id. at 221.
43. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 495 (2003).
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minimum allowed by Congress for federal lands.44 In 1984,
Navajo finally asked the Secretary of the Interior, Donald
Hodel, to adjust the rate to a fair market value.45 The Bureau
of Indian Affairs Navajo Area Director, who was delegated
approval authority by the Secretary, decided that a fair market
return for the coal would be 20%.46 Peabody filed an
administrative appeal.47
While Peabody’s appeal was pending, and apparently on
the eve of it being denied,48 Peabody hired a lobbyist
recommended by SCE who was a close personal friend of the
Secretary.49 Shortly after meeting with the lobbyist, Secretary
Hodel signed a departmental internal memorandum that the
Court of Claims determined was prepared by Peabody, delaying
a decision on the appeal and directing negotiations between the
parties.50 All the Navajo knew was that the appeal was not
being decided and that “‘someone from Washington’ had urged
a return to the bargaining table.”51 “Facing severe economic
pressures,” the Navajo soon capitulated and accepted the 12.5%
royalty rate for a mine adjacent to Black Mesa they owned
exclusively.52 It was also agreed the rate would apply to the
Hopi and Navajo jointly-owned Black Mesa site.53
In 1993, the Navajo and Hopi initiated litigation to set
aside the agreement, based upon the government breaching its

44. Id. at 496.
45. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
46. See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 222. The United States
Supreme Court noted that the 12.5% royalty rate, while the minimum
required by law, is also the customary rate found in most such leases issued or
readjusted after 1976. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488–89. However, the
unusual use of slurry suggests that the true market rate would have been
higher given the plant’s isolation and its need for the Black Mesa coal.
47. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 222.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. Id. at 222–23.
51. Id. at 223.
52. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1328; see Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at
223–24. The negotiation also resolved the Hopi and Navajo right to tax
Peabody separately on the coal, capping the total payments to 20.5%. Id. at
224. However, arguably an 8% tax plus the fair royalty rate of 20% should
have provided a total of 28.5% to the Hopi and Navajo. See id.
53. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 498 n.5; Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at
224.
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trust responsibilities.54 In 1999, the Navajo filed a separate
lawsuit claiming SCE and Peabody had illegally conspired to
influence the federal government, among other claims.55 The
Supreme Court twice reversed the Circuit Court in the original
royalty case, and ultimately in 2009, it found that no applicable
statute allowed for a money damages remedy for Hodel’s
conduct.56 The conspiracy lawsuit, however, continued until
2013.57
While this litigation was percolating, environmentalists
raised a new set of issues that would question Mohave’s
viability.58 On February 19, 1998, Grand Canyon Trust and
Sierra Club filed a citizen suit against Mohave’s owners
alleging Clean Air Act violations of emission limits, compliance
orders, and reporting requirements.59 The lawsuit requested,
among other things, the installation of pollution control
equipment known as scrubbers, and fabric filter dust collectors
known as baghouses.60

54. See Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 224.
55. See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272
(D.D.C. 2002).
56. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 287 (2009).
57. A settlement was reached between Navajo and SCE in August 2011.
Press Release, Navajo Nation Dep’t of Justice, Navajo Nation, Peabody
Energy, Salt River Project and Southern California Edison Reach Settlement
on
Navajo
Royalty
Litigation
(Aug.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://empowerblackmesa.org/press/2011_08_04_Navajo_Nation_Peabody_Rea
ch_Settlement_on_Navajo_Royalty_Litigation. Reportedly, Peabody Coal, and
the Navajo Nation approved reopening the royalty agreement in ten years,
with an immediate payment of $50,000,000 and a commitment by Peabody to
provide an additional $15,000,000 in infrastructure assistance to Navajo
communities in the mining areas over the next ten years. Press Release,
Buckley Sandler LLP, Buckley Sandler Partner Negotiates Settlement of
Navajo Nation’s 12-Year Royalty Litigation with Peabody Energy, Salt River
Project & Southern California Edison (Aug. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.buckleysandler.com/news-detail/buckleysandler-partnernegotiates-settlement-of-navajo-nations-12-year-royalty-litigation-withpeabody-energy-salt-river-project-southern-california-edison. The agreement
also included $10,500,000 in a disputed retroactive bonus payment, an
agreement to make annual bonus payments of $3,500,000, scholarship
payments for Navajo students, and a one-time bonus payment of $1,550,000.
Id.
58. See Complaint at 12–17, Grand Canyon Trust, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., No. CV-S-98-00305-LDG (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 1998).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 11.
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During this proceeding, on March 19, 1999, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a
report that determined “no other single emissions source is
likely to have as great an impact on visibility in the [Grand
Canyon]” as Mohave.61 EPA announced that it would consider
applying controls through a formal rulemaking pursuant to
Clean Air Act visibility requirements.62
In October 1999, SCE and its co-owners signed a consent
decree agreeing to reduce emissions by installing and operating
the requested scrubbers and baghouses.63 The consent decree
also provided that the upgraded technology64 would not have to
be installed if the facility ceased to operate in 2005.65 According
to SCE, the prospect that EPA would require similar controls,
the possible need to sell Mohave due to California’s oncoming
energy deregulation, and the potential termination of coal and
water rights were factors leading it to settle.66
California was indeed launched into its ill-fated energy
industry deregulation.67 California’s utilities were ordered to
divest generating resources sufficiently to create an electricity
market.68 SCE applied for permission to sell its Mohave share

61. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23; accord The
Mohave Generating Station & Grand Canyon Visibility, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/mohave/index.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
62. See, e.g., Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
63. The terms of the consent decree were incorporated into EPA’s
requirements for the facility. The Mohave Generating Station & Grand
Canyon Visibility, supra note 61.
64. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 3 & n.3, 4.
65. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 8, Grand Canyon Trust v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., No. CV-S-98-00305-LDG (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 1999).
66. See Application Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Data Request Set (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n May 29, 2008) [hereinafter Data Request Set]; see also Mohave
Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *14 (discussing the consent decree);
Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution of SO2
Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec.
20, 2006), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/EFILE/A/
63119.pdf.
67. See Alan Ramo, California’s Energy Crisis—The Perils of Crisis
Management and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 ALBANY L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK J. 1, 3 (2002).
68. See, e.g., id.
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to an out-of-state buyer.69 Before the deal was approved,
deregulation fell apart, and rates skyrocketed.70 The
Commission halted the Mohave sale, fearing that Mohave’s
cheap coal baseload electricity was too important to lose to an
out-of-state owner outside of CPUC’s control.71
The Hopi’s and Navajo’s support for Mohave now was
becoming ambivalent: On the one hand, coal and water
royalties provided 30% of the Hopi’s entire revenue, while at
one point unemployment was hovering at 50%, with 44% of the
Hopi families with children under eighteen living in poverty.72
For the Navajo, Mohave generated 10%–13% of its General
Fund, with royalties and taxes ranging from $16.7 million to
$19.1 million per year,73 and 93% of the 270 jobs at the mine
were held by Native Americans, almost all Navajos.74 Peabody
reportedly asserted that the total economic benefit to the tribes
and local communities from Mohave operations were about $83
million annually.75
Yet, the N-aquifer, from which 4400 acre-feet per year of
water was drained,76 was essential to the Hopi and Navajo
traditional life and customs:
[T]he coal operation caused great harm to the way of life of the
farmers because there was not enough clean water for vegetation.
The Navajo Aquifer has been the sole source of drinking water for
residents that live near and on the Black Mesa region . . . .
Many ranchers and farmers have depended on the N-Aquifer
and its ability to feed natural springs and seeps that supply water for
livestock, general public drinking use, and cultural offering places.
Today, due to the increase of drought and climate change, water
is ever more important in a region that receives less than 12 inches of
rainfall per year. Black Mesa families become economically stressed
69. See In re Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for Authority to
Sell Its Interest in the Mohave Generation Station, Application No. 99-10-023,
Interim Opinion, 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS 32, at *3–5 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Mohave Sale].
70. See id. at *4.
71. See id. at *14–18
72. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 27–28.
73. Id. at 29.
74. See id. at 4, 28.
75. See Application Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave
Generating Station, Application No. 02-05-046, Supporting Testimony
Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave Generating Station 1, 15
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter SCE Supplemental
Testimony].
76. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 5.
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when drought conditions increase because their income depends on
the health of the Navajo Aquifer to feed their livestock and
farmlands. Black Mesa families have to drive 20 to 60 miles to haul
water for their personal consumption and for their livestock and farm
lands at least 3 times a week.77

The irony, or really the tragedy, is that global warming,
resulting in part from the burning of coal at Mohave, was
already contributing to Southwest drought conditions.78
All these issues collided as water and coal contracts
expired in 2005.79 SCE entered into negotiations with the Hopi,
Navajo, and Peabody.80 The Navajo insisted that the royalties
litigation had to be settled,81 and the Hopi insisted that the old
aquifer was off-limits.82 A study was commissioned examining
a new source, the C-Aquifer.83 However, many of the N-Aquifer
issues applied to the C-Aquifer.84
At the same time, SCE was concerned with the long-term
economics of the plant, given that it depended upon Colorado
River water to operate, and its rights to that water terminated
in 2026.85 Finally, SCE “considered that there could be a range
possible [sic] future costs of addressing Mohave’s CO2 emission
based upon greenhouse gas regulatory proposals under
discussion at that time.”86
Environmentalists, fearing that SCE may just pull the
plug, urged the CPUC to study alternatives to Mohave’s coal

77. In re Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. Regarding the Distribution of
SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Modified Testimony:
Distribution of Mohave Generating Station SO2 Credit Revenues I-1, III-6
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 16, 2011).
78. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melilo
& Thomas C. Peterson eds., 2009).
79. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 2.
80. See id. at 5–6.
81. See id. at 30.
82. See id. at 5–6 (discussing how Hopi opposed the use of all
groundwater).
83. Id. at 6–10.
84. SCE Supplemental Testimony, supra note 75, at 22 (“It should be
remembered that the C-Aquifer, like the N-Aquifer, is still groundwater and
may ultimately have similar issues, like claims on the water, that the NAquifer has.”).
85. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 9; Data Request Set, supra
note 66.
86. Data Request Set, supra note 66.
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technology.87 The CPUC agreed, requiring that “[t]he
alternatives investigated should include options that provide
economic stability to the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation, and
where
appropriate,
utilize
renewable
resources
for
generation.”88 The study, completed in early 2006, found that
“the solar dish and wind options have relatively low capital and
operating costs, potentially making them an economically
attractive alternative.”89
The negotiations ultimately failed.90 As 2005 approached,
SCE made a last-ditch request that the environmental
plaintiffs extend the time limits in their consent decree, which
they declined to do.91 SCE finally announced it was suspending
operations at Mohave, and in June 2006, it concluded it could
not resume operations in part because of coal and slurry water
costs “estimated based upon the then-ongoing efforts to return
Mohave to service including the coal and water negotiations
with the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe and Peabody Western Coal
Company.”92 SCE ultimately decided it was not cost-effective
and decommissioned and dismantled the power plant.93
In hindsight, it appears Mohave was doomed from the
beginning. For years, it ran beyond its design parameters,
resulting in an accident in 1985 killing several workers.94 It

87. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 40–42.
88. Id. at 70.
89. SARGENT & LUNDY LLC, STUDY OF POTENTIAL MOHAVE
ALTERNATIVE/COMPLEMENTARY GENERATION RESOURCES, at ES-35 (2006),
available
at
http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/documents/
pl_mohaveAlternatives041306.pdf.
90. See Neil Young, Arizona Utility Made Effort to Save Mohave
TIMES,
Oct.
20,
2013,
Generating
Station,
LAUGHLIN
http://www.laughlintimes.com/articles/2013/05/29/news/local/news884.prt.
91. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) for a Comm’n Finding That
Its Procurement-Related & Other Operations for the Record Period January 1
Through December 31, 2006 Complied with Its Adopted Procurement Plan,
Application No. 07-04-001, Opinion on 2006 Energy Res. Recovery Account
(ERRA) Proceeding, Decision No. 07-12-027, at 5–7 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Dec. 20, 2007).
92. Data Request Set, supra note 66.
93. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) to End the Monthly
Reporting Requirement Under Comm’n Decision 04-12-016, Application No.
10-02-011, Decision to End S. Cal. Edison Co.’s Monthly Reporting
Requirement Under Comm’n Decision 04-12-016, Decision No. 10-09-035, at
1–2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 23, 2010).
94. See Mohave Coal Plant Accident, supra note 22, at 462–63, 1994 Cal.
PUC LEXIS 216, at *28.
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used an unusual coal supply technology that left it dependent
on troublesome coal and water rights mired in controversial
federal/tribal politics,95 and its emissions affected one of the
most beloved of the nation’s national parks.96 Its energy was
cheap, 3.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh),97 but only if it
avoided pollution controls installed at other coal plants, and
only so long as it benefited from what Hopi and Navajo argued
was a century of coal and water rights exploitation.98
Yet, the very people claiming they had been victimized
financially and environmentally fought to keep the plant open.
Whether the price for coal and water was fair, it remained an
essential part of the reservation income. It is a clear example
that even a seriously flawed electricity resource will be difficult
to terminate if people are economically dependent upon it. As
the plant faced permanent closure, the idea of a “Just
Transition” was born.
III. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION’S
JUST TRANSITION CASE
The CPUC’s consideration of Mohave’s impacts on the Hopi
and Navajo communities began in a 2002 proceeding
examining the potential closure of the facility.99 After extensive
evidentiary hearings, the CPUC found that Mohave’s closing
would have “devastating effects on the Hopi and Navajo people
and tribes as a whole, as well as on the workers at the Mohave
facility, at the mines and on the pipeline.”100
Then, after Mohave closed in December 2005, the CPUC
again considered issues related to Mohave in SCE’s general
rate case.101 In this arcane ratemaking proceeding, a
remarkable coalition of environmentalists and grassroots
95. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
96. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
97. Mohave Sale, supra note 69, at *15.
98. See generally Young, supra note 90 (discussing the plant needing to
upgrade to “comply with environmental regulations,” and the Native
Americans’ concerns).
99. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26.
100. Id. at 14.
101. See Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for Authority to
Increase Its Authorized Revenues for Elec. Serv. in 2006 & to Reflect That
Increase in Rates, Application No. 04-12-014, Opinion on S. Cal. Edison Co.’s
Test Year 2006 Gen. Rate Increase Request, at 1 (Cal Pub. Utils. Comm’n May
11, 2006) [hereinafter SCE Rate Case].
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Native American organizations, the Just Transition Coalition
(described more fully below) intervened to demand that the
CPUC allocate funds from the sale of Acid Rain SO2
allowances, which were an unneeded windfall if Mohave
remained closed, to help transition the Hopi and Navajo
communities to cleaner energy alternatives.102
In response to Just Transition Coalition’s intervention, the
CPUC required SCE to set the SO2 allowance revenues aside in
a separate account that would be disbursed in a future
proceeding.103 That future proceeding began in December
2006.104 In that case, the CPUC affirmed its authority to
disburse the revenues from the sale of Mohave’s sulfur
allowances to help the Hopi and Navajo communities impacted
by Mohave.105
A. THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM ALLOWANCES AT ISSUE
The availability of acid rain allowances provided a
convenient funding source for the Just Transition Coalition, as
it could for other coal-fueled power plants.106 In 1990, Congress
enacted Title IV of the Acid Rain Program,107 which initiated a
system of buying and trading allowances or credits for tons of SO2
emitted by fossil-fuel facilities.108 An allowance authorizes a
utility or industrial source to emit one ton of SO2 during a given
year or any year thereafter.109 At the end of each year, a source
must hold an amount of allowances at least equal to its annual

102. Id. at 20 & n.16, 21; Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for
Authority to Increase Its Authorized Revenues for Elec. Serv. in 2006 & to
Reflect That Increase in Rates, Application No. 04-12-014, Motion for a “Just
Transition” in Response to Closure of the Mohave Generating Station, at 1–3
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Motion for a Just
Transition].
103. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 26–27 (noting that this action,
setting aside the revenues in a separate fund, was essential for preserving the
funding to be disbursed in a way decided in a future proceeding).
104. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25.
105. Id. at *1.
106. See generally CHI. CLIMATE EXCHANGE, THE SULFUR DIOXIDE
EMISSION ALLOWANCE TRADING PROGRAM: MARKET ARCHITECTURE, MARKET
DYNAMICS AND PRICING 5 (2004), available at http://www.ccfe.com/
education_ccfe/SO2_Background_Drivers_Pricing_PDF.pdf (discussing how
the SO2 trading program “provides a profit incentive”).
107. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
108. See id. at 902.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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emissions, e.g., a source that emits 5000 tons of SO2 must hold at
least 5000 allowances that are usable in that year.110 However,
regardless of how many allowances a source holds, it is never
entitled to exceed federal emissions limits set to protect public
health.111 Allowances are allocated to utilities without charge as
an incentive to reduce their emissions.112 As a 56% owner of
Mohave, SCE’s annual share of allowances until 2010 was just
under 29,800, and, beginning in 2010, was over 29,200.113 An
interesting aspect of the proceeding was that the allowances’
potential value shifted significantly from being worth hundreds
of dollars per allowance to being worth only a few dollars at most,
due to EPA regulatory actions and judicial rulings.114
B. THE JUST TRANSITION COALITION AND PROPOSAL
The Just Transition Coalition first appeared in SCE’s rate
case.115 It was composed of a strategic alliance of
environmental and grassroots Native American interests
including the Indigenous Environmental Network, Black Mesa
Trust, Black Mesa Water Coalition, To’ Nizhoni Ani, Grand
Canyon Trust, and the Sierra Club, working with Grand
Canyon Trust’s attorney who had extensive experience before
the CPUC, Sara Myers.116 The Coalition’s purpose was to help
the Navajo and Hopi communities, devastated by Mohave’s
operation and closure, transition to a renewable energy
economy.117 As Roger Clark of the Grand Canyon Trust, a
founding member of the Coalition, observed:
The best scenario would be for Edison to give up trying to keep
Mohave open and, instead, invest in alternative energy projects and
transmission lines that would help the Hopi and Navajo exploit their
potentially abundant wind and solar power resources . . . . With
110. See id. § 7651b(g).
111. See id.
112. See CHI. CLIMATE EXCHANGE, supra note 106, at 5.
113. See 40 C.F.R. § 73.10 (2012). The numbers were calculated by adding the
“Total Annual Phase II” allowances for each boiler, and multiplying that total by
.56 for SCE ownership percentage.
114. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *27–31 (describing
change in allowance value); cf. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 916–18
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the EPA lacks statutory authority to arbitrarily
reduce SO2 emissions allowances).
115. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *3 & n.1.
116. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 20 n.16. The authors joined Myers
on behalf of the Sierra Club after the initial protests were filed.
117. See SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 21.
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California wanting to invest in cleaner forms of energy . . . why buy
another 20 years of inefficient, old coal-fired generation?118

When Mohave closed, the Coalition advocated for exactly
that—investment in renewable resources that would assist the
Navajo and Hopi communities.119 The Coalition asserted that
this transition was equitable due to Mohave’s operation and
closure’s devastating economic and social impacts and decades
of what it considered subsidized cheap coal power.120
The Coalition identified sulfur allowance revenues to fund
this transition because the allowances were no longer needed
after Mohave closed, and because SCE received the allowances
for free.121 As the Coalition summarized: “After 35 years of
running Mohave at great cost to the Navajo and Hopi, it is now
unreasonable to permit SCE to reap hundreds of millions of
dollars in new, unearned revenues from the sale of sulfur
allowances as the result of SCE’s own decisions to close
Mohave.”122
The Coalition’s proposal recommended that the best and
most appropriate use of the Mohave allowance proceeds was “to
promote renewable energy development that directly benefits
the Navajo Nation and/or the Hopi Tribe, while providing”
electricity to California residents and ratepayers.123 To assure
that its proposal fell within the CPUC’s authority, the Coalition
tied its proposal to SCE’s current renewable procurement
requirements, a process in which SCE requires proposals to
meet the statutory renewable portfolio standard.124 It
suggested that the allowance revenues be used as an adder to
incentivize renewable projects in California that are owned or
co-owned with significant ownership interest by the Hopi Tribe

118. Marc Lifsher, Deal May be Near on Power Plant, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2005, articles.latimes.com/print/2005/nov/08/business/fi-mohave8 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119. See Motion for a Just Transition, supra note 102, at 2–3.
120. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 22.
121. See Motion for a Just Transition, supra note 102, at 10, 15.
122. Id. at 15.
123. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Just Transition
Coal.’s Opening Brief, at 5–8 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter
Opening
Brief],
available
at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/EFILE/BRIEF/160768.pdf.
124. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *26.

522

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

and/or Navajo Nation, or located on lands owned by the Hopi
Tribe and/or Navajo Nation.125
C. POSITIONS OF OTHER PARTIES
The Hopi and Navajo participated in the proceeding, as did
the utility unions and ratepayer advocates.126 Initially, the
Hopi Tribe requested a “Mohave-suspension relief package”
with direct financing and financial assistance to the Tribe.127
The Navajo Nation proposed that the revenues fund renewable
energy studies and development that benefited the Nation.128
Neither initial proposal tied the use of the funds to SCE’s
procurement process. By the end of the proceeding, after years
of mediation, workshops, and litigation, the Hopi and Navajo
proposed, similar to the Just Transition Coalition, that the
revenues incentivize renewable energy generation pursuant to
SCE’s procurement process that benefited their respective
tribes.129
Other parties participated in the proceeding. A group
representing union workers and a non-profit representing
ratepayers proposed that the allowances be retired.130 SCE and

125. See id.; Opening Brief, supra note 123, at 5–6.
126. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *2–4.
127. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Protest of the Hopi
Tribe to Application of S. Cal. Co. Regarding the Distribution of SO2
Allowance Sale Proceeds, at 5 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter Hopi Tribe Protest].
128. See, e.g., Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the
Distribution of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended
Operation of Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Navajo
Nation Proposal for Allocation of the Proceeds from the Sale of SO2 Credits
Resulting from the Shutdown of Mohave Generating Station, at 1 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/EFILE/REPORT/104886.PDF.
129. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *23–26.
130. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Admin. Law Judge’s
Ruling on Treatment of Proceeds from Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Sales by S.
Cal. Edison Co., at 13 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter ALJ
Ruling],
available
at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/EFILE/
RULINGS/133248.pdf.

2014]

TRANSITIONING TO A GREEN ECONOMY

523

the CPUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates proposed that the
allowances revenues be returned directly back to ratepayers.131
D. THE CPUC’S LEGAL AUTHORITY AND FINAL DECISION
Although there was precedent for the CPUC considering
community impacts from utilities,132 using sulfur allowances to
benefit out-of-state non-ratepayers was novel. Thus, the CPUC
initially conducted a mediation to see if a resolution could be
reached.133 Although those efforts failed, the Coalition’s
position started to coalesce with the Hopi and Navajo
positions.134 Since the case presented a matter of first
impression, the CPUC initially examined its legal authority to
disburse the allowance revenues under the California
Constitution, the California Public Utilities Code, and federal
law,135 as well as California’s more recent requirements under
its renewable energy portfolio standard.136
The California Constitution and statutory authorities give
the CPUC broad authority to regulate the public utilities of the
State.137 This authority includes the ability to act in a
supervisory and regulatory manner to do all things “which are
necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction.”138 This supervisory and regulatory power has been
construed liberally to allow the CPUC broad power to regulate
utilities within its jurisdiction.139 As part of its broad authority,
the CPUC has the authority to exercise equitable jurisdiction as
131. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *32–33.
132. See Application of Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. for Authorization to Sell the El
Dorado Hydroelectric Project to El Dorado Irrigation Dist. Pursuant to Pub.
Utils. Code Section 851, Application No. 98-04-016, Opinion, 1999 Cal. PUC
LEXIS 677, at *1–2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 16, 1999).
133. See Just Transition Coalition Wins Request for Formal Mediation
OBSERVER
(Apr.
3,
2013),
from
CPUC,
NAVAJO-HOPI
http://www.navajohopiobserver.com/main.asp?SectionID=29&SubSectionIS=4
1&ArticleID=5693&TM=30930.23.
134. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *4–6.
135. See ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 15–16.
136. See id. at 29.
137. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6 (“The commission may fix rates,
establish rules, . . . and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public
utilities subject to its jurisdiction.”).
138. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 2012).
139. See Wise v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (“[T]he PUC . . . [has] broad regulatory power over public
utilities . . . .”).
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an incident to its express duties and consistent with its
regulation of public utilities and established legal principles.140
For example, the CPUC can issue injunctions, create constructive
trusts, reform contracts, and issue cease and desist orders.141 In
particular, “[w]here necessary, the Commission may attach
conditions to a transaction in order to protect and promote the
public interest.”142
The CPUC’s authority can be limited only by express
direction or statutory enactment of the California Legislature.143
SCE and the CPUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates argued
that the CPUC’s authority to award allowance proceeds to a third
party was limited by rate refund requirements.144 Rate refunds
are “specific amounts held by utilities as rebates from their
suppliers and earmarked for customer ‘refunds’ by prior
commission orders and utility tariffs.”145 To qualify as a rate
refund, three requirements must be met: (1) the funds to be
refunded must have been previously collected in rates from
ratepayers; (2) the funds must be previously ordered to be
refunded by a regulatory agency; and (3) the refunds must be
made to the customers who paid higher rates, to the extent
practical.146 The CPUC found that none of these criteria were
satisfied because the allowance revenues were not held or
collected as rates, the allowances were not previously ordered
refunded, and the ratepayers did not pay for the allowances.147
The CPUC also examined whether it had regulatory
authority to allocate the allowance revenues to promote
renewable development.148 The CPUC relied upon California’s
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) program, which mandates
140. See, e.g., id. at 487.
141. Id.; Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 25
Cal. 3d 891, 907 (Cal. 1979); see also W. San Martin Water Works, Inc. v. San
Martin Cnty. Water Dist., 71 Cal. Pub. Util. Rptr. 75, 85 (1997) (discussing how
the CPUC may “exercise equitable powers in aid of jurisdiction specifically
conferred upon it . . . . Restoration of the status quo is within these powers”).
142. In re Citizens Telecomm. Co. of Cal., 210 Cal. Pub. Util. Rptr. 4th 189,
236 (2001); accord CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (West 2012).
143. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 62 Cal. 2d 634,
650, 653 (Cal. 1965).
144. See, e.g., ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 16 (summarizing SCE’s and
DRA’s arguments).
145. Cal. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 845 (Cal. 1979).
146. See id. at 839–40; ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 17–18.
147. ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 17–18.
148. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *39–40.
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that load-serving entities including SCE achieve a target of
meeting 33% of their customer demand with renewable electric
generation by 2020.149
Other authorities supported this approach, although the
CPUC did not rely upon them. For instance, the Federal Clean
Air Act provides that one of its purposes is “to encourage
energy conservation, use of renewable and clean alternative
technologies.”150 The California Public Utilities Code also
recognizes the interest of the State to improve economicallydisadvantaged conditions for minorities, including Native
Americans151 by increasing procurement of renewable
energy.152 California Public Utilities Code further provides that
preference should be given for “renewable energy projects that
provide environmental and economic benefits to communities
afflicted with poverty or high unemployment, or that suffer
from high emission levels of toxic air contaminants, criteria air
pollutants, and greenhouse gases.”153
After reviewing its authority, the CPUC determined that:
The Commission’s role as a utility regulatory agency is . . . the
touchstone in evaluating the parties’ proposals for disposition of the
SO2 allowance proceeds. . . . [T]he Commission’s options for
allocating the SO2 allowance proceeds are limited to those that are
connected to the Commission’s ongoing regulation of California
public utilities and that may be implemented under the
Commission’s supervision.154

Under these principles, the CPUC found that it had
authority to disburse the allowance revenues to incentivize
renewable generation that benefited Hopi and Navajo
communities.155 The CPUC then considered the equity issues and
found that “[i]n view of the history of Mohave and the
Commission’s long-standing concern for the consequences of its
closure, it is reasonable to use the SO2 allowance proceeds to
benefit the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation, as well as SCE
customers.”156 To accomplish this, the CPUC created a revolving

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (West 2012).
42 U.S.C. §7651(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8282(b) (West 2012).
Id. § 8281(b)(1)(D)–(E).
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13(a)(7).
ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 15–16.
See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *18.
Id. at *39.
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fund that would utilize the revenues for deposits required as part
of the renewable procurement process.157
“The Navajo Nation applaud[ed] the [CPUC] for crafting an
equitable solution that would provide economic benefits to the
tribes and mitigate the devastating effects of the closure of the
Mohave Generating Station . . . .”158 The Hopi Tribe called the
decision “the most sound and equitable approach for all affected
parties.”159 The Just Transition Coalition supported the decision
stating that “[t]he devastation that Mohave’s operation and
closure caused to the Navajo and Hopi communities warrant this
result.”160
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION
Beyond its immediate impact in facilitating future Hopi and
Navajo renewable energy development, the CPUC’s decision
presents a roadmap for other states to consider creative solutions
to help communities transition away from fossil-fuel generation.
The facts in another case are unlikely to be the same as the
Mohave case, but it demonstrates how a community’s history and
circumstances may establish an equitable case supporting
remediation. It may in fact be easier to justify the expenditure of
even greater ratepayer funds for transition if the impacted
communities are within the state and are themselves ratepayers.
157. Id. at *39–40.
158. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Comments of the
Navajo Nation on Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 1 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M042/K159/42159470.pdf.
159. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Hopi Tribe’s
Comments on the Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 2 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M049/K629/49629398.pdf.
160. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Just Transition Coal.
Comments on the Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 5 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M042/K157/42157387.pdf.
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State public utility commissions161 throughout the country
can craft similar creative solutions.162 Similar to the CPUC, other
State Public Utility Commissions generally have broad power to
consider the public interest in their regulation of utilities.163 Also
similar to the CPUC, the only limitation to this broad authority is
generally specific, enumerated statutory exceptions.164 Further,
the majority of states have some type of renewable standard,165
which means that encouraging development of renewable energy
should be within the relevant state agency’s jurisdiction.166
CONCLUSION
The CPUC’s creative approach provides a framework for
considering how to transition a community away from fossil
fuel generation. Other state utility commissions have similar
authority as the CPUC, and creative disbursements like this
can provide the necessary incentive to spur critical green
development in impacted areas. Consideration of the equities,
as the CPUC has illustrated, can be done consistent with an
agency’s jurisdictional authorities in a way that does not
undercut ratepayer or other potential interests.

161. State agencies that regulate utilities have many different names such
as public utility commissions, corporation commissions, or public service
commissions.
162. See, e.g., Victory for Clean Air as Minnesota Public Utilities
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